IECEx

INTERNATIONAL ELECTROTECHNICAL COMMISSION

IEC SCHEME FOR CERTIFICATION TO STANDARDS FOR SAFETY OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FPOR EXPLOSIVE ATMOSPHERES (IECEX SCHEME)

Ex Management Committee, ExMC

ExMC/56A/DA: Draft Agenda for the 2nd Meeting of the ExMC to be held in Braunschweig, Germany, from 5 to 8 September 2000

British Electrotechnical Committee contribution in respect of Agenda Item 13: Evolution of the IECEx Scheme.

Only ACBs in fully participating countries can issue IECEx Certificates of Conformity. Why? (See IECEx 01 clause**, based on the former IECEE 04, Clause 5.4)

Example:

Country #1 is "fully participating", i.e. it accepts incoming IECEx Certificate of Conformity ("CofC") and has harmonised its national "Ex" standards with IEC standards. Manufacturers in this country have given access to their own home market to any manufacturer from another fully participating country who holds an IECEx CofC. They accept the situation because they have equal access to all the other fully participating countries. This is the objective of the IECEx Scheme.

Country #2 is in "Transition", i.e. does not yet accept IECEx CofC and/or still has national differences in "Ex" standards.

Manufacturer #1 in Country #1 obtains an IECEx Certificate of Conformity ("CofC") and an ATR covering the national differences in Country #2 where he wishes to sell his product. He takes the product to country #2 who refuse to accept the IECEx CofC and demand that their own ACB must issue a local national certificate before he can sell the product in their country. Manufacturer #1 pays for the local national certificate and is able to sell his product there.

Problem 1: However, if his competitor, **Manufacturer #2**, in Country #2 (a "Transition" country) can obtain an IECEx CofC even though Country #2 has not harmonized its standards, or will not accept the IECEx CofC from manufacturer #1, this is a very <u>unfair</u> situation for Manufacturer #1 because Manufacturer #2 has access to Country #1 without having to pay any extra charges.

Manufacturer #1 is at a disadvantage in his own country as well as at a disadvantage in Country #2. This would result in all manufacturers resisting the introduction of the IECEx scheme at all and wanting to protect their own market from outside IECEx certificate holders.

The scheme does allow Manufacturer #2 to obtain easily a National certificate from an ACB in Country #1 which at least gives him some access while his own country is making progress towards full participation.

It is the same situation for Manufacturer #1 in Country #2. Manufacturer #2, because he would prefer to be able to get an IECEx CofC, has the incentive to persuade his own country to harmonise the standards and accept an IECEx CofC.

Problem 2: There is no incentive for ACBs in Country #2 to support full participation or ever allow incoming IECEx certificates to be accepted. There is also no incentive to harmonize their standards with IEC. In fact there is every incentive to resist acceptance and harmonization because the ACB will make more money issuing their own national certificates using their own national differences.

Solution:

Only if the ACB in Country #2 is unable to issue an IECEx CofC will they try to persuade their country to accept IECEx CofC and want to harmonise their "Ex" standards with IEC. When they become fully participating they will be able to issue IECEx certificates and be able to compete with the ACB in Country #1

There must be no relaxation of these principles or the Scheme will never achieve its primary objectives of:
One standard;

One Certificate;

One Standard;

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